In this paper, we study the logical relations between different notions of knowledge and belief by means of a generalization of the usual Kripke models for epistemic logic. We argue that the obtained generalized Kripke models might be useful for carefully distinguishing the many different notions of knowledge and belief. We identify the (highly idealized) notions of objective knowledge and rational (introspective) belief, which correspond with fairly standard notions of knowledge and belief, and propose a system OKRIB for combining both notions which differs essentially from some other such proposals found in the literature. We also consider some other notions of knowledge and belief, and study how they relate to objective knowledge and rational belief. Recen°tly,-there has been a conside able increase in the amount of `theo"ry `l ''°logic of knowledge `and belief (or "e-pistemic logic), mainly through the irnpuise` s of researchers in= the field of Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science.'One of the main rtopicsof-discussion }is=the problem of logical omniscience, which consists, roughly speaking, of the fact that according to the traditional (possible world) semantics an agent knows/believes the logical consequences (including all tautologies) of anything he knowsibelieves. This property does not seem to be appropriate for resource-bounded agents, which have only limited lreasonirig powers.
In this paper, the central topic is not the problem of logical omniscience but rather the relation between knowledge and belief. (The problem of logical omniscience will be treated in a sequel of this-'paper.)-',ltk oughuthis' elation.has already ehfstudied`bh} philosophical logicians and by researchers in Al, we feel there are still a number of unclarified issues here. Since there are a number of different notions of kriowledgesand belief, an adequate study of the relation between knowledge and belief shout'd first make clear of which notions the relation is studied.
Therefore the notions whose i this paper rs:t:treated separately. We concentrate on rather idealized notions of knowledge and belief which we call objective knowledge and rational belief, respectively. However, some other notions of knowledge and belief will also be considered. (All of these notions will be closed under logical consequence, though.) functional Kripke models, sketch. the relation between these models and traditional Kripke models, and give some arguments for preferring (generalized) functional Kripke models. The semantics of objective knowledge and rational belief are given in sections 3 and tspectively. In section 5 we combine both notions. Section 6 contains a comparison with some other ;opinions a iou the of knowledge and and a discussion of some alternative notions, of _knowledge,.and in section 7 we discuss alternative (more or, less probabilistic) notions of ,belief. We.endrw,ith a conclusion.
Functional.
Our basic langua .L inbuilt ug.from aset ._of pro osi iora letters (p, q, r, ..) and the logical -'constants and A We further use the constants v, ta and = which;;are defined as usual. E (w') (w)
Proof. Trivial.
The reason for introducing functional Kripke models is that they form a bridge between the traditional Kripke models and the general kind of models we propose for epistemic logic: (W',w" E 6(W) =* W" E 6(W')). E W (w =: = 6(w')). represented' by means :of sets of possible worlds °and (2) in the gehealize' models modal operators may-have nonstandard= valuation clauses.1eveti<less, " classof generalized functional models will ofieri,`tiirnout` to be equivalent to a class'o't functional models which corresporidYw t -,traditional'I rtpke, models; so one can often invoke well-known results and method's to obtain soundness and` completeness-results.
In the fcs iowin section, an example of the useof, non-standard valuation`clauses:will be given. Our justification for the explicit representation of epistemic statesfin. the generalized functional models is that it helps to systematize the study of the relations between various epistemic mi dalities For" euanple,'the t"wo central°ntons in tlii papei -objeatiive knowledge and rational belief -refer to different epistemic states, and a e therefore as'stronigly,related-as some authors seem to think, whereas-some (atr( Jnglyrelatea) fotiot ofknbw1edge and belief might be considered to refer to'differeh aspects of`the `sane episternie state. (Cf. sections 5 and 6.) In the generalized unotiottal!tirodels to be`t sefuliii study of epistemic logic to a higher level of 'informal rigour' (in the sense of Kreisel). Kay: agent cx-objectively knows that i e. (p is the base. given the informatidn availableto a.
n every 1world` that is possible)
Since we will restrict ourselves to the one agent case, we will usually omit the, subscri pts The notion of ;objectrveknowledge applies agent which incapable of information;
wevdo not the to the (im)possibility of logic of -this notion of objective knowledge will be denoted by OK. Closely following the above intuitive explanation of the meaning of the operator K, we propose the following semantics for K: The class of information `state models is easily-seen to be :to>a ,class of functional models which we call OK-models and which correspond with Kripke models for S5. The above method of identifying the logic generalization of the method by which the logic of the knowledge of processors in a distributed system is identified to be S5. Inlthe`latter case, one takes°the'tinformation state of a"pf'ocesso`'to be identical `to the internalsta"te' of the'proc'essor. Notree that although the introspection axioms Again we usually omit the subscript. NoticeLthafthe above n`ofion of'belief is a very strong one. In fact, if Bay, then a will be inclined to express his belief bye"sayingIharhe knows that cp. If an agent says that he (only) believes that (p, then in064st'1ikelya weaker notion of belief is used.
Some possible weaker notions are treated' irisectitin Let P(w) be the rational belief state (of an agent a) in w and remember that for any epistemic state S the set of wrldsxwhich`are possible $accordingto S is deno`ted`by IISII Ilence II(3(w)II denotes the set of worlds which are, considered"-"pos ible(byg"a)° n W. Row,
The from rationality of the agent: a rational agent,wili~ ,not adhere to an $et of beliefs; but; yi1L.revise this set to consisten ode. The introspection condition denVes.frofn.tl a surnpno sthat a calf nal agent is ulfy aware of his own belief state. Hence in every world he considers to be a possible candidate of the actual world he must have the same belief state. A rational agent is not infallible, hence we do not to determine the
of their epistemic attitudes. 
VW,W' E W (W E 11P(w)II = R(W) = R(w ))
3.
w=Bcp <a Vw' E IIR(w)11 w' rp.
Elements of EB are called belief states.
Just as in the -,case of the information state models, the class of -beliefstate' models equivalent to a class of functional fnodels wh ch correspond°with` verb` famil ar`ke models. These functional models are called "SIB-models and they correspond With 16j ke models for KD45. Let (p e LB. The following are equivalent: (i) For every belief state model M M = p.
(ii) =RIB<P (ill) =KD45(P Proof. Similar to 3.3.
Combining knowledge and belief
The information objectively available to a rational introspective agent surely contains all information about his own rational belief state,. Hence, if,, ,a world w' is possible given the information available to an agent a in world w, then a's rational belief state in w' is identical to that in w. Further, if a world w is a member of IISII, for some rational belief state of agent a, # case is 2. dW,W E W (W E R(W) =* R(W) = R(W')) (ii) ,-then-.it is reasonable to assume that the set of worlds which are possible according to as information state in w is a subset. of 1 1 S 1 1 . (A., world which is considered(!) to be objectively possible from a world believed to be a possible candidate for the actual world should itself be believed to -be, apossible candidate for the actual world) hence we arrive at the following additional assumptions oRthe relation between information classes and rational belief classes:
OBJECTIVITY: W E IIK(w')il i3(w) _ i3(w').
BELIEVE&`SOINDNESS: w E Ilp(w')Ir ilK(w)II
Another interesting assumption is the following:
BELIEVED COMPLETENESS: W E II(3(w')II :
IIK(w)ll.:D 11)3(w This assumption might be appropriate for an agent who is very confident in 'tlie `sense that he believes to.have fully, exploited the nformatigi available to him However, in general we will not assume=.belie ed completeness. The semantics for ®lK&(O)R fB, the system in which knowledge and (overconfident) rational introspective belief are combined, becomes:. An OK&RIB frame is a tuple F = <W,x,(3>,where 1. <W,x> is an OK-frame 2. <W,i> is a RIB-frame 3. Vw,w' E W (w E K(w') = i3(w) _ i3(w')) 4. Vw,w E W (w E i3(w') = K(w) C R(w')).
(ii) An OK&RIB-model is a functional model based on an OK&RIB-frame. Let cp E'`LjB `Tht following are equivalent: (i) For every information & belief state model M Mt(p. 6. `Knowledge which implies u' u a nbeliet It is no surprise that 't K&RIE is not consistent with the ideas `about the r`el'atii n between knowledge in Hintikka (1962)the notion -of objective knowledge and rational °belief are rather different from the originally studied epistemic notions: However, objective knowledge and rational belief do seem to correspond with the nowadays predominant notions of knowledge and `belief. 1 everthele`ss;; OTK&IEIIB" differs in a number of respects friim -the, system which was proposed in Kraus (i,98-6Y-arffliàn thoroughly studied from a technical point of view in van der Hoek (1989) . This system -let us call it KL -is more extensive than OK&RI B, since it also treats the notions of common"'knowledge and'cmn on belief. As far as pure knowledge propositions (i.e. propositions containing no other'-modal operators than K) and pure. belief propositions are concerned, KL and OK&RIB agree. However, the OK&RIB theorem Bcp BKcp is not derivable in KL, and adding it to°KL would lead to the derivability of Btp Kcp. As already°observed by Wolfgang Y °enzen (1978 p.80), Btp Bl (P -is-"' ly'r6as0ndble in case Ba(p stands foi"i-6 is convinced thatcp'" and not in case Ba p=meanssortie hi g like'"a presumes.that ip Hence at first 'sight the-non-derivability of 1 cp=6BK(p in K1 might be defended by arguing that KL does not intend to capture the notion of conviction. However, A relation R is called semi-euclidean iff Vxyz ((xRy n xRz (i) If R = R1 u R2, where R1 is an equivalence relation and R2 is serial, transitive, euclidean and R1 R2 R2 = R-2R 1, then-R transitive,: and semi euclidean. -,K'-,K' , Wolfgang Lenzen suggested that for every reasonable notion of knowledge K and-belief B the equivalence By -,K-,Kcp should hold. Additionally assuming Kcp D cp and Kcp D KKcp he arrived at his already mentioned conclusion that the logic of knowledge is at least as strong as
Weak notions of belief
The notion of rational introspective belief of section 4 is a very strong notion of belief In this section we will consider some weaker versions of belief which can still be considered rational and introspective. We take serious the remark in section 4 that in general a rational belief state S
should not be equated with 11511 and we'-consider som-e'modalities which refer to the (relative)
likelihood of subclasses of IISIL Consider,i? with the following intuitive meaning
Pace: agentoc presumes cp, i.e. cp is true in every possiblet world `which a considers to be not too unlikely.
The rationale behind presuming is that often some situations which are strictly speaking not excluded by the evidehce`'are so unlikely that they are neglected. functional model semantics of RICP, the-1o&ic of rational (introspective) presumed belief, is
given by adding the following c7iaracteristic clause to the belief state models w=Pq a Yw' a n(t(w)) w'= , where n : EB -pW s.t.
